
From: Flynn, Diana K (CRT)
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2009 11:54 AM
To: Rosenbaum, Steven (CRT)
Cc: Coates, Christopher (CRT); McElderry, Marie K (CRT)
Subject: New Black Panther Party FW: Comments on the proposed default judgment filings in NBPP

We have been asked to provide comments on the Voting Section's proposed motion and papers in support of default judgment and relief. Marie McElderry and I have reviewed the papers and discussed. Her comments, which also reflect my views, are below. I add the following observations:

1. We can make a reasonable argument in favor of default relief against all defendants and probably should, given the unusual procedural situation. The argument may well not succeed at the default stage, and we should expect the district court to schedule further proceedings. But it would be curious not to pray for the relief on default that we would seek following trial. Thus, we generally concur in Voting's recommendation to go forward, with some suggested modifications in our argument, as set out below.
2. The fact that *Chamberlain's* minimal standard for entry of a default judgment may be satisfied does not entitle us to one. See Marie's discussion of the case law below. The district court will retain considerable discretion to withhold relief on default and schedule a hearing. Given that we are seeking relief against political organizations and members in areas central to First Amendment activity, it is likely that the court will not order relief absent such further proceedings. That said, the procedural posture leaves few good alternatives to filing in support of such relief now.
3. By far, the most difficult case to make at this stage is against the national party and Malik Shabazz. There is discussion in the internal papers of the history of the organization with respect to voter intimidation with the use of weapons and uniforms. If the Voting Section opts for seeking relief against the national defendants at this stage, we suggest including that history in our supporting Memorandum. Our case against the nationals may be a bit of a reach, particularly at this stage, particularly because of First Amendment concerns. But we already brought the case and made the allegations. See *COMPLAINT*, par. 12. I assume that this reflects the Division's policy judgment that it is appropriate to seek such relief after trial. We probably should not back away from those allegations just because defendants have not appeared. And Voting does seem to have evidence in support of the allegations.
4. We would NOT say that First Amendment defenses are irrelevant at this stage. (Contra, *MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT at 4*). The court should anticipate likely defenses and so should we. See Marie's detailed discussion

below. We think a discussion of the narrowness of the proposed relief, which is generally discussed throughout the memorandum, can be used explicitly at this point to explain why First Amendment defenses are unlikely to prevail. In other words we can argue up front that the proposed order is carefully crafted to avoid any First Amendment concerns. Emphasis can be placed on the fact that our proposal is designed to prevent the paramilitary style intimidation of voters, and otherwise leaves open ample opportunity for political expression.

The First Amendment concerns Steve expressed earlier are well-taken, and I think proceeding against the nationals is a very close call. But it appears to us that there is a basis for the relief we seek, and the unusual posture of the case probably requires that we say the relief is appropriate on default. In any event, we should expect to be required to try these issues.

Marie may make some additional suggestions to the wording of the papers, if permitted.

From: McElderry, Marie K (CRT)
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2009 5:15 PM
To: Flynn, Diana K (CRT)
Subject: Comments on the proposed default judgment filings in NBPP

Comments on proposed filings re default judgment in *United States v. New Black Panther Party For Self-Defense*, No. 2:09-cv-0065 SD (E.D. Pa.)

We have been asked to comment on whether the United States should seek injunctive relief against all defendants, and, if so, what relief we should request. As I understand the situation, the documents Voting proposes to file are the Motion for Default Judgment (dated April 30), the Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Default Judgment (dated April 30), and the proposed Order (dated May 6). Further support for these filings is contained in the May 6 internal Remedial Memorandum Concerning Proposed Injunction Order.

Standard for obtaining default judgment. An overarching principle that we need to keep in mind is that the Third Circuit "does not favor entry of defaults or default judgments." *U.S. v. \$55,518.05 In U.S. Currency*, 728 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1984). Rather, it is its "preference that cases be disposed of on the merits whenever practicable." *Hritz v. Woma Corp.*, 732 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1984).

Our proposed Memorandum of Law relies on the three-part test in *Chamberlain v. Giampapa*, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000), as governing a district court's determination whether a default judgment is proper. As the Third Circuit more recently acknowledged in an unreported decision, however, *Chamberlain* cites *U.S. v. \$55,518.05*, *supra*, as the source of that standard, and *\$55,518.05* is a case where a defendant sought to overturn a default judgment. *Hill v. Williamsport Police Dept.*, 69 Fed. Appx. 49, 51 (3d Cir. 2003). In *Hill*, the court noted that "both major treatises on federal practice and procedure, as well as the Ninth Circuit, set out additional factors to those listed in *Chamberlain* as appropriate for consideration when ruling on motions to grant default judgments." 69 Fed. Appx. at 51 n.3.¹ Among those factors are "whether material issues of fact or issues of substantial public importance are at issue," "how harsh an effect a default judgment might have," and "the strong policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." *Ibid.*

Nonetheless, the court in *Hill* determined that it is bound to follow *Chamberlain* in determining whether a district court has abused its discretion in deciding whether to issue a default judgment in the first place. The problem with importation of the three-part test to that context is that step two of the test requires the court to determine "whether the defendant appears to have a litigable defense," and that determination is complicated where, as here, the defendant has totally failed to file a response to the complaint (as opposed to having filed late). Our proposed Memorandum of Law, pg. 4, alludes to that complication by quoting the unreported decision in *Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Starlight Ballroom Dance Club, Inc.*, 175 F. Appx. 519, 522 (3d Cir. 2006) ("The second factor is the 'threshold issue in opening a default judgment.'"). We then take the position that the presence or absence of a meritorious defense "has no relevance at this stage of the proceedings." Memo. at 4. That is not actually the case, however, since the Court will be following *Chamberlain*.

In any event, I think that we can get over that hurdle by anticipating, as we do in our May 6 internal Remedial Memorandum, possible defenses that might be raised, *i.e.*, First Amendment claims and the post-litigation

denunciation of the conduct of the Philadelphia chapter by the Party (and possibly by Malik Zulu Shabazz). I believe that the district court will anticipate such possible defenses and will want to know how we would address them. Indeed, by the time we file this motion and/or the court sets a hearing, the defendants may file something raising those or other defenses. Given that the court is bound to follow the three-part test, I think that we need to address in the Memorandum in support of the Motion at least those defenses that we have already identified.

I am also not sure that we have made a sufficient showing that we would be prejudiced by denial of a default judgment. When we filed the Complaint, we assumed that we would be engaging in the usual course of litigation, including discovery and filing of legal briefs. The opportunity to receive a judgment without pursuing all of those steps would be a benefit to us, but I am not sure that the court will be persuaded that we would be prejudiced by having to try the case on the merits, which is the preferred method of proceeding under Third Circuit case law. Especially in a case such as this, which is not cut and dried, I think the court will feel that its judgment would be informed by a more deliberate process.

Whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action against the Party and its national leader. I have some reservations about whether we have a sufficient factual basis to state a claim against the Party and Malik Zulu Shabazz. Paragraph 12 of the Complaint alleges that they “managed, directed, and endorsed the behavior, actions and statements of Defendants Samir Shabazz and Jackson.” The May 6 internal memorandum refers to an announcement made in advance of the November 4 election of a “plan to post party members at polling places.” But nowhere do I see that we can show that either the Party or Malik Zulu Shabazz suggested, counseled, or endorsed the bringing or brandishing of weapons in advance of what happened in Philadelphia. Assuming that the main behavior we seek to enjoin is bringing weapons to the polls, I am not convinced that we can establish a basis for an injunction against the Party or Malik Shabazz by showing that the Party has violent and racist views against non-blacks and Jews. The additional information discussed on page 8 of the May 6 internal memorandum about

the Party's past actions of bringing weapons to political rallies may, however, be the basis for an argument that both the Party and Malik Shabazz should reasonably have known that the Philadelphia defendants might believe they were authorized to carry weapons to the polls, but I am not sure that would be sufficient to justify the relief we are seeking.

As I read our justification for relief against the Party and Malik Shabazz, it is based largely on Malik Shabazz's statements *after* the events in Philadelphia in which he defended the actions of King Samir Shabazz and Jerry Jackson on national television as based on the alleged presence of members of the Aryan brotherhood or the American Nazi party at that particular polling place. In addition, the Voting Section is relying on admissions made by Malik Shabazz to members of the section. It is unclear how we would present that evidence to the court. That "endorsement," however, is complicated by the statements on the Party's website renouncing the events in Philadelphia and suspending the Philadelphia chapter. It appears that we may have difficulty proving when those statements were added. At least as to the Party, those statements could be an impediment to proving a violation at all, not just an impediment to injunctive relief.

What type of injunctive remedy should be sought. Certainly, we have established a sufficient basis for the very limited injunctive relief that is recited in the proposed order dated April 30 against defendants King Samir Shabazz and Jerry Jackson. But I understand that such a limited injunction will not accomplish very much.

As to those "Philadelphia" defendants, however, the proposed order dated May 6 goes somewhat further. It seeks to enjoin defendants "from deploying or appearing within 200 feet of any polling location on any election day in the United States with weapons." Presumably, both deploying and appearing are meant to be modified by "with weapons." It is not clear what we mean by deploying, especially since the Voting Section indicated in its May 1, 2009, email that, in light of discussions with the Front Office, it does "not seek to enjoin the wearing of the NBPP uniforms at the polls." According to most dictionary definitions, the term "deploy" is used mainly in the context of

troops. I think it suggests that the military-type uniforms used by the Party are an integral part of what we want to enjoin, regardless of our stated intent not to seek to enjoin the wearing of those uniforms.

It appears that, at least as to the Philadelphia defendants, the violation we have alleged encompasses not only bringing the weapon, but also the intimidating atmosphere created by the uniforms, the military-type stance, and the threatening language used. I have not had time to do a comprehensive analysis of the First Amendment implications of attempting to enjoin members of the New Black Panther Party (or any other hate group, such as the American Nazi Party or the Klan) from wearing their uniforms at the polls on election day. The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word.” *Texas v. Johnson*, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (flag-burning case). It may not, however, “proscribe particular conduct *because* it has expressive elements.”

In this case, Party members’ wearing of the uniform would likely be viewed as “expressive conduct.” It would be relevant, then, to know whether the government has asserted an interest in regulating the wearing of the uniform that is unrelated to the suppression of expression. Here, the government’s predominant interest, as expressed in 42 U.S.C. 1973i(b), is preventing intimidation, threats, and coercion (or attempts to do so) against voters or persons urging or aiding persons to vote or attempt to vote. Part of the intimidation in this case is wearing a military-style uniform, which suggests some kind of authority to take action. That aspect of the uniform could theoretically be separated from the particular message that this uniform is intended to convey, *e.g.*, racial hatred. Thus, appearing at the polls in such a uniform with a weapon is more intimidating than appearing in street clothes with a weapon. Interestingly, all three of the Declarations that we propose to present to the court focus on a combination of the uniform and the weapon. None of them mentions the third element of intimidation, *i.e.*, the verbal threats and racial taunts and slurs.

The April 30 Memorandum in support of our Motion addresses the

possible First Amendment claims of the Philadelphia defendants in the context of whether injunctive relief would harm them, *i.e.*, the third part of the traditional test for obtaining an injunction. Memo. at 13-14. As to those defendants, our arguments appear to be sufficient to support the narrow injunction that the Voting Section was seeking as of April 30. It is obviously a closer question whether it would also support either Paragraph V of the May 6 proposed order, either as presently worded using the word "deploy," or a proposed order that explicitly mentions the Party uniform in some way.

As discussed above, my problems with applying Paragraph V to the Party and Malik Shabazz involve whether we have enough evidence to show that they violated the statute. If a decision is made that the evidence is sufficient, I would suggest a separate paragraph in the order for injunctive relief against these defendants that is narrowly tailored to the scope of their violation. That violation is described at various points of the Complaint as "deployment of armed and uniformed personnel at the entrance to [a] polling location," which involves the organization and planning of such activities involving the members of the Party. This portion of the injunction should therefore be geared to enjoining those actions. We might also want to ask the court to order these defendants to undertake some type of procedures or training, such as mentioned on page 8 of the May 6 internal Remedial Memorandum, that would make abundantly clear that the national organization and its leaders do not endorse intimidation, threats or coercion of voters or those who are urging or aiding them to vote.

Marie K. McElderry
Appellate Section
Civil Rights Division

¹ As the concurring judge in *Hill* pointed out, the Eighth Circuit does not use

the three-part test outside of the context where a party against whom default has been entered has moved to set aside the judgment. 69 Fed. Appx. at 53.